About the Strait

The Strait of Hormuz lies between Oman and Iran, connecting the Gulf of Oman with the Persian Gulf, and the Arabian Sea beyond. The strait is about 33 kilometres wide at the narrowest point, though shipping traffic passes through a narrower traffic separation scheme (TSS), which consists of a 3-kilometre-wide channel each for inbound and outbound traffic. It is important for several reasons, but mostly because it is the world’s most important oil checkpoint, carrying about one-fifth of the world’s oil.

“In 2011, around 35 per cent of the world’s seaborne trade in oil was moved by tanker through the Strait…[including] some 63 per cent of India’s total oil imports, 42 per cent of China’s, 82 per cent of Japan’s imports and 74 per cent of South Korea’s,” notes researcher David Brewster in India’s Ocean (2015). The situation, as reported by economist Nayantara D Hensel in Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific (2017), was the same in 2013. “As of 2013, about 30% of oil carried on the seas – 17 million barrels per day – was transported through the Strait of Hormuz, of which 85% of this crude oil was transported to Asian markets…”

Hensel adds that between 2009 and 2013, the Strait of Hormuz shipped a larger volume of crude oil and petroleum than the Strait of Malacca in Southeast Asia, the Suez Canal in Egypt, and Bab el-Mandeb, which connects the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea and the Mediterranean.

The colonial era

From the early days of Islamic expansion, the seaport was crucial to Muslim empires. From the mid-tenth to the fifteenth century, Islamic trade in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea was flourishing. Near the Strait of Hormuz, Mecca, Jidda, and Bahrain rose as trading centres. The items exported from the region included attar, gold brocades, fine silk, carpets, high-quality armaments, dried fruits, etc. These goods were in high demand in East Africa, India, Southeast Asia, and China. In return, porcelain, silk piece-goods, tea from China, cotton textiles, precious stones, wheat and rice from India, gold, ivory, etc, from East Africa found their way to the Middle East. In The Cambridge Illustrated History of the Islamic World (1996), historian KN Chaudhuri remarks that the “high value” of these goods in the Middle Eastern markets made “such lengthy and hazardous journeys worthwhile.”

Among those who had recognised the trading potential in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean were the Portuguese. Hoping to monopolise the spice trade, the Portuguese realised it was “essential to seal off the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb in the Red Sea to prevent Muslim shipping from gaining access to India,” writes Chaudhuri. Brewster concurs, “Portugal implemented its strategy by taking control of all major entry points in between.” By 1515, they had captured Hormuz.

Brewster adds, “Their maritime state in India, based on the newly founded capital Goa, enforced its monopolistic policy by controlling Hormuz and by an annual blockade of Bab al-Mandeb.” It was only in 1622 that a combined force of the English and Persians captured Hormuz and destroyed the century-long Portuguese control of the Gulf.

India’s link with the Hormuz

According to Brewster, India’s most immediate interest in the Persian Gulf is energy. “India is highly reliant on imported oil and gas; in 2010 it imported around 70 per cent of its oil requirements, much of that from the Gulf,” he notes. Scholars estimate that this reliance will increase in the coming years as the gap between demand for oil and domestic production grows.

Some analysts, according to him, claim that India faces a ‘Hormuz Dilemma’ in the Strait of Hormuz similar to China’s ‘Malacca Dilemma’ in the Malacca Strait. India’s fears are heightened by the rise of the port of Gwadar, east of the Strait of Hormuz, and the potential for China to establish its naval presence there. “This creates an imperative for India to take an active role in the security of the Strait of Hormuz or to develop good security relationships with the states located on or near the Strait,” reckons Brewster.

Iran, the US, and the UNCLOS

Being one of the world’s most important shipping routes, it has been a key strategic objective for the US to keep Strait of Hormuz open. Iran, however, has threatened to close it, increasing US anxiety. This tension is rooted in a 1982 UN convention.

The Hormuz is considered one of the straits used for international navigation within the meaning of Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), an international agreement, signed in 1982, that established a legal framework for marine and maritime activities. UNCLOS divides marine waters into five broad zones — Internal Waters, Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, Exclusive Economic Zone and High Seas. Further, Article 38 grants all ships the right to transit passage. However, Iran and Oman do not consider the Strait of Hormuz as an international strait, claiming 12 miles of territorial sea, leaving ships to enjoy only the “innocent passage.”

The United States is also not a party to UNCLOS. “The United States claims the right of transit passage in the strait as prescribed under UNCLOS and being reflective of customary international law…Iran counters this claim by insisting that the provisions of UNCLOS may only be applicable to states that are party to it,” argues Upadhyaya. This has only escalated tensions with Iran and the US.

Although Iran has not closed the Strait, it has earlier placed mines in the area causing significant disruption. Hensel cites an April 1988 incident when the US forces engaged in Operation Praying Mantis and destroyed two Iranian surveillance platforms and sank three ships after their navy ship was damaged by an Iranian mine. There were more such instances reported from the same year.

In India’s Maritime Strategy: Balancing Regional Ambitions And China (2020), academic Shishir Upadhyaya writes: “Indeed, in 2015, the US Navy reported that there were almost 300 encounters between Iranian and US maritime forces in the Persian Gulf…” The situation worsened in 2018, with US President Donald Trump imposing trade and financial sanctions.

As a counter response, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards  Corps (IRGC) conducted multiple exercises aimed at blocking the Strait. “As a result of the threat mongering by Iran,” opines Upadhyaya, “the UAE and Saudi Arabia have invested in several pipelines, which have significantly reduced the impact of a potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz and provided alternate routes for transporting oil.”

“Whilst Iran has the capacity to block the straits, it is unlikely to do so in the near future, mainly because…the retaliation that such an act would invite from U.S. forces and the resultant debilitating impact it would have on the Iranian economy would be long term,” writes Upadhyaya.